Safeheron and Responsible Fintech Institute are testing post-quantum cryptography with banks and regulators, with plans to eventually open-source the underlying protocol for independent scrutiny.
Safeheron and the Responsible Fintech Institute (RFI) have launched a cross-regional pilot to evaluate post-quantum cryptography (PQC) for digital asset transactions, with selected banks and regulatory stakeholders participating across multiple jurisdictions.
Safeheron intends to eventually open-source the underlying PQC protocol, allowing independent researchers and security experts to scrutinise cryptography intended to secure institutional digital assets. The initiative also plans to publish a whitepaper covering its research, protocol design and testing findings.
“Safeheron has long advocated for open-source cryptography, because accountability and good governance demand it. We intend to open-source our PQC code. Cryptography securing institutional assets should stand up to independent scrutiny, not ask for trust,” said Jag Foo, Chief Security & Policy Officer at Safeheron.
The pilot uses a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol supporting ML-DSA-65, the digital-signature standard specified by NIST FIPS 204. Testing will cover wallet generation and on-chain transfers on the quantum-resistant NEAR testnet, alongside assessments of cross-border interoperability, operational resilience and governance.
Participating regulators include Abu Dhabi Global Market, Gelephu Financial Services Office and Malta Financial Services Authority, while participating banks include Bison Bank and DK Bank. Regulators will initially observe testing before contributing to a governance workstream.
Safeheron leads protocol and engineering work, while RFI handles governance and stakeholder coordination. The pilot also includes a tentative non-custodial 2-of-2 MPC design.
The initiative combines open-source cryptography, shared research, multi-institution testing and regulatory participation as financial institutions prepare for potential quantum threats to existing public-key cryptography.
